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I. INTRODUCTION
International free trade agreements under the auspices of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) seriously undermine the
international human right to adequate food.1 Conceivably, those
deprived should be able to seek redress under Article 11 of the
International. Covenant- on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR), which spells out the right to adequate food.
Unfortunately, while the concept of the right to adequate food has
developed substantially since its inception, its implementation has
been slow. 2 It is not a well-developed tool for individuals or the
groups representing them to redress harms that will likely result
from the current Doha Round negotiations of the WTO.
The
limitations in the law's development suggest a need for an alternative
strategy. Food sovereignty, a movement that has as one of its central
tenets that food should be removed as a tradable commodity from
WTO agreements, provides such an alternative.
Section I of this article discusses the present state of world food
insecurity and draws from the experiences of Mexican farmers and
consumers under the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA)-the 1994 agreement liberalizing trade between the United
States, Canada, and Mexico-to show how food security can be
undermined by agricultural trade liberalization. It also discusses
how further agricultural trade liberalization under the WTO's Doha
Round will likely have similar results, even if agricultural goods are
exempted from the negotiations. Section II details how the right to
adequate food is embodied in international human rights law. It
argues that developments in this area of the law have increased
people's opportunities to obtain redress when their rights have been
denied due to trade policies. It also details the law's developmental
limits. Section III discusses the food sovereignty movement and
argues that it is a better strategy for protecting people's food security
than the right to adequate food.

II. FOOD INSECURITY AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF FURTHER
AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION UNDER THE DOHA ROUND
The end of 2006 marked the ten-year anniversary of the 1996
World Food Summit in Rome, where more than 180 countries pledged

1.
rights and
focuses on
2.

And that is not all, for international trade agreements can harm labor
rights to healthcare and water, to name a few examples. This paper simply
the right to adequate food.
See discussion infra Part II.B.

2007]

LIMITS OF IN TERNA TIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LA W

1073

3
to halve the number of undernourished people in the world by 2015.
Yet today, more undernourished people live in the developing world
than in 1996, and the number of hungry people in the world is
currently increasing by four million per year. 4 Although the number
of undernourished people in the developing world fell from 823
million to 800 million between 1990 and 1996, in 2006 that figure had
increased to 820 million. 5 By contrast, keeping the summit pledge
would require reducing the number of undernourished by 31 million
every year until 2015.6
7
Eighty percent of the world's impoverished live in rural areas.
The majority are small farmers who depend on agriculture.8 Most do
not simply suffer from a lack of food; they also do not have sufficient
access to resources such as land, water, and seeds to enable them to
feed themselves. 9 Approximately twenty percent of the hungry live in
urban areas, but migrants from rural areas are increasing that
number. l 0
The United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on the Right to
Food, the individual appointed by the UN Commission on Human
Rights to ensure that governments are meeting their right to food
obligations, reminds us that "[h]unger and famine are not
In fact, the
inevitable-they are a violation of human rights.""
per person
calories
2,100
to
provide
planet could produce enough food
world
the
existing
twice
people-almost
per day for 12 billion
population.12

A. Corn and Food Insecurity in Mexico after NAFTA
"Trade liberalization," especially the lifting of state import
barriers such as tariffs and import quotas that hinder the flow of
goods across national borders, is often touted as a means to lift people

U.N. Food & Agric. Org. [FAO], The State of Food Insecurity in the World
3.
Stamoulis),
Skoet & Kostas
(prepared by Jakob
2006, at 4 (2006)
ftp:lftp.fao.orgldocrep/faol009/aO750e/aO750eOO.pdf.
FAO, World Hunger Increasing: FAO Head Calls on World Leaders to
4.
2006, http://www.fao.org/newsroom/en/news/2006/
Honour Pledges, May 30,
1000433/index.html.
Id.
5.
Id.
6.
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Human Rights, Economic,
7.
Social and Cultural Rights: The Right to Food, 4, E/CN.4/2006/44 (Mar. 16, 2006)
(preparedby Jean Ziegler).
Id.
8.
9.
Id.
Id.
10.
Id. 3.
11.
12.
Id.
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from hunger and poverty. 13 The rosy promise of free trade has not
been matched by reality, however. A primary example is how the
liberalization of the corn trade under NAFTA and the WTO left
Mexican farmers and consumers vulnerable to price shocks, eroding
14
Mexico's food security.
Trade liberalization in Mexico started before NAFTA, in the mid1980s. i 5 By 1987, Mexico had signed more trade agreements than
any other nation. 16 In the 1990s, Mexico reduced trade barriers and
lowered government intervention in agricultural markets in order to
comply with these agreements. 17
In 1992, for example, the
18
government eliminated its program of subsidized credit for farmers.
By 1999, Mexico completely dismantled CONASUPO, the statetrading agency responsible for support policies, marketing, and
distribution of basic grains. 19
This ended price supports for
farmers. 20
This farm safety net was replaced with a smaller and
declining market-based subsidy program, PROCAMPO, which has
21
substantially decreased the support available to Mexico's farmers.
In 1992, Mexico also radically overhauled farmland policy under
the guise of "agrarian reform" by allowing private ownership of

13.
See, e.g., Kym Anderson & Will Martin, Agricultural Trade Reform and the
Doha Development Agenda, in AGRICULTURAL TRADE REFORM AND THE DOHA
DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 12-21 (Kym Anderson & Will Martin eds., 2006).
14.
"Food security" is a concept that has evolved after the World Food Summit
to mean "a situation that exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social[,]
and economic access to sufficient, safe[,] and nutritious food that meets their dietary
needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life." FAO, Trade Reforms and
Food Security: Conceptualizing the Linkages, at 29, (2003), available at
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/005/y4671E/y4671EOO.pdf [hereinafter FAO Conceptualizing
the Linkages]. This definition has created controversy because it is seen as
presupposing market mechanisms as reforms. The use of "food security" by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture, in its assessment of householders' evaluations of their food
supply, was also recently criticized as a sanitized and euphemistic description for
hungry people. Whenever possible, this paper does not use the term food security to
describe the condition of undernourished people, themselves, but rather uses it to
describe the societal, physical, and economic situation that results in people becoming
undernourished or unable to produce food for themselves.
15.
GISELE HENRIQUES & RAJ PATEL, NAFTA, CORN, AND MEXICO'S
AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION 1 (Interhemispheric Resource Center Feb. 13,
2004), available at http://www.irc-online.org/americaspolicy/pdf/reports/0402nafta.pdf.
16.
Id.
17.
Id.
18.
Alejandro Nadal & Timothy Wise, The Environmental Costs of Agricultural
Trade Liberalization: Mexico-U.S. Corn Trade under NAFTA 17 (Working Group on
Dev. & Env't in the Americas, Discussion Paper No. 4, 2004), available at
http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/ Pubs/rp/DP04NadalWiseJulyO4.pdf.
19.
Id.
20.
ALEJANDRO NADAL, THE ENVIRONMENTAL & SOCIAL IMPACTS OF ECONOMIC
LIBERALIZATION ON CORN PRODUCTION IN MEXICO 26 (World Wildlife Fund for Nature
2000), available at http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what we-do/issues/livelihoods/downloads/
corn.mexico.pdf.
21.
Id. at 28-29.
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communal land for the first time in nearly 100 years. 22 The Mexican
government rewrote Article 27 of the 1917 constitution, which had
made land available to peasant communities through ejidos, or
communal farming communities. 2 3 The newly revised Article 27
allowed ejido land to be individually demarcated and certified so that
it could be titled and privatized. 24 It was no longer illegal for ejido
land to be rented, for example. 25 It was assumed that the resulting
tenancy security would enable large, unproductive landholders to
rent their land to peasants and smaller producers who did not have
land, thereby increasing the productivity of the large landholders'
26
operations.
Although the privatization program was supposed to be
voluntary, local or regional authorities conditioned farmers' receipt of
subsidies or credit on certification. 2 7 Between 1993 and the end of
October 2003, nearly eighty percent of all ejidos and communities
certified their land. This land reform allowed the biggest operatorsbig producers, agribusiness, local political bosses, and government
officials-to consolidate their holdings and purchase larger, better
parcels of farmland. 28 Smaller producers and communal landowners
ended up selling and renting their lands, not to maximize
The land was
productivity, but because of emergencies. 29
increasingly bought and rented by the elite, who were able to obtain
30
the land at very low rates.
At the same time that Mexican ejidos were selling or renting
their lands, Mexico's reduction of agricultural tariffs and import
quotas under NAFTA was opening the country's agricultural markets
to U.S. and Canadian exports, especially corn.3 1 Corn is Mexico's
most widely grown crop,3 2 accounting for more than two-thirds of the
gross value of agricultural production and the source of income for 18
million people.33 It is a vital food staple, with sixty-eight percent

Ana de Ita, Mexico: Impacts of Demarcationand Titling by PROCEDE on
22.
Agrarian Conflicts and Land Concentration, Sept. 20, 2005, at 1, available at
http://www.landaction.org/display.php?article=336.
23.
Id.
24.
Id.
25.
Id.
Id. at 5.
26.
27.
Id. at 6.
28.
Id.
Id. at 16.
29.
Id.
30.
31.
Nadal & Wise, supra note 18, at 3.
Laura Carlsen, The Mexican Experience and Lessons for WTO Negotiations
32.
on the Agreement on Agriculture, Address Before the Committee on Industry, External
Trade, Research, and Energy of the European Parliament (June 11, 2003), available at
http://www.irc-online.org/americaspolicy/pdf/commentary/0306eu.pdf.
Nadal & Wise, supra note 18, at 4.
33.
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grown for humans, compared to a world average of twenty-one
34
percent.
In the years after NAFTA went into effect in 1994, the United
States further embraced free-market, free-trade policies for
35
agriculture by abandoning price floors and food-security reserves.
36
As a result, prices for U.S. agricultural products collapsed.
A
handful of transnational agribusinesses were able to export food to
Mexico at prices below the cost of production because of U.S. policies
38
37
Mexico's corn imports nearly tripled.
that encouraged production.
Cheap U.S. corn glutted the Mexican market and depressed prices
below levels necessary for many intermediate and subsistence
Mexican farmers to earn a living. 39 The average corn price that
Mexican farmers received dropped by more than forty percent
between 1990 and 2003.40
Displaced corn farmers theoretically should have been able to
switch to more profitable crops or find jobs in sectors where Mexico
had a comparative advantage over the United States and Canada. In
reality, agricultural prices fell for most traditional crops, making a
shift to other crops less viable. 41 Export-oriented crops, such as
horticultural crops, did not need excess labor because they had
become more mechanized and input efficient than expected. 42 Many
poor farmers were forced to continue to grow corn despite the hard
conditions. 43 Approximately 1.7 million farmers in Mexico were
45
displaced. 44 Many flocked to the cities, depressing urban wages.
Meanwhile, at the end of 1998, Mexico ended decades-old price
controls over tortillas and ceased subsidizing tortilla mills. 46 These
changes, along with the high degree of concentration in the entire
corn-commodity chain, increased the price that Mexican consumers
paid for tortillas. 47 Within a year, tortilla prices in Mexico City rose
48
by fifty percent and by even more in rural areas.

34.
Id.
35.
TERRI RANEY & SHAYLE SHAGAM, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. [USDA], NAFTA'S
IMPACT ON U.S. AGRICULTURE: THE FIRST 3 YEARS (1997), available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/agoutlook/sep 1997/ao244e.pdf.
36.
Id.
37.
PETER M. ROSSET, FOOD Is DIFFERENT: WHY WE MUST GET THE WTO OUT
OF AGRICULTURE 56-63 (Zed Books 2006).
38.
Carlsen, supra note 32.
39.
NADAL, supra note 20, at 7-9.
40.
ROSSET, supra note 37, at 57.
41.
NADAL, supra note 20, at 36.
42.
Id. at 21.
43.

HENRIQUES & PATEL, supra note 15, at 5.

44.

Carlsen, supra note 32.

45.

LORI WALLACH & PATRICK WOODALL, WHOSE TRADE ORGANIZATION? A

COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO THE WTO 200 (The New Press 2004).
46.
Id. at 199.
47.
Id.
48.
Id.

20071

LIMITS OF INTERNA TIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LA W

1077

These and other trade-liberalization policies under NAFTA
resulted in an increase in Mexican poverty, malnutrition, and school
drop-out rates.4 9 Three-fourths of Mexican households now live in
poverty, an eighty percent increase since 1984.50 Four-fifths of rural
Mexico lives in poverty, defined as living on less than two dollars per
day, and over half live in extreme poverty, defined as living on less
than one dollar per day. 5 1 Each year, more than 150,000 Mexican
children die before reaching the age of five due to illnesses related to
52
nutrition.
Ironically, immediately after the NAFTA negotiations, Mexico
was perceived to be a winner because import quotas and tariffs were
to be phased out over the course of 15 years through a "tariff rate
quota system." 53 Under this system, the Mexican government could
fix monthly quotas on corn imports and impose a tariff on imports
above the quota. 54 In effect, however, corn faced no tariffs less than
three years into NAFTA. 55 Citing grain-supply shortages, Mexico
unilaterally approved U.S. imports over NAFTA quotas and then
declined to collect tariffs. 56 Revenues lost due to the government's
failure to implement the tariff rate quotas for corn are estimated to
57
be more than two billion dollars.
Mexico's dependence on imported corn continues to threaten
Mexican consumers' access to food today.
Counterintuitively,
increases in corn imports have not resulted in cheaper corn-product
prices. But decreases have resulted in substantially increased food
prices. In late 2006, Mexico experienced what has been described as
the worst tortilla crisis in its modern history. 58 Dramatically rising
international corn prices, spurred by demand for the corn-based fuel
ethanol, have led to expensive tortillas. 59 Tortilla prices have tripled
or quadrupled in some parts of Mexico since the summer of 2006.60

49.

Id. at 199-200.

50.

TIM WISE, NAFTA's UNTOLD STORIES: MEXICO'S RESPONSE TO NORTH

AMERICAN INTEGRATION (Interhemispheric Resource Center June, 2003), available at
http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/NAFTA'sUntoldStoriesJune03TW.pdf.
51.
Id.
52.
Steven Suppan & Karen Lehman, Institute for Agriculture and Trade
Policy, Food Security and Agricultural Trade Under NAFTA, July 11, 1997,
http://www.agobservatory.orgllibrary.cfm?refID=29561.
53.

ROSSET, supra note 37, at 61.

54.
Id.
55.
Nadal & Wise, supranote 18, at 5.
56.
Id.
57.
HENRIQUES & PATEL, supra note 15, at 6.
58.
Manuel Roig-Franzia, A Culinary and Cultural Staple in Crisis: Mexico
Grapples With Soaring Prices for Corn-and Tortillas, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2007, at
Al.
59.
Id.
60.
Id.
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The Mexican federal government is investigating charges of price
gouging against the company Gruma, which controls as much as
eighty percent of Mexico's tortilla market,6 1 and others. 62 Archer
Daniels Midland (ADM), the leading U.S. ethanol maker, 63 also owns
a twenty-seven percent stake in Gruma 64 and a forty percent share in
a joint venture with Gruma to mill and refine wheat.6 5 This means
that when high tortilla prices force Mexican consumers to switch to
less nutritious white bread, Gruma and ADM still win, while Mexican
consumers lose. 66 On January 18, 2007, Mexican President Calder6n
announced an agreement with business leaders capping tortilla
prices. 67 But Calder6n's price cap is a voluntary "gentleman's
agreement. ' 68 A 2007 study by the lower house of Mexico's National
Congress showed that many tortilla makers were ignoring Calder6n's
69
edict.
B. Agriculture and Food Insecurity in Developing Countries under the
WTO Agreement on Agriculture
The situation in Mexico under NAFTA is but one example of how
agricultural trade liberalization under multilateral trade agreements
can spur hunger and deprive farmers of their ability to grow food.
But it is not an uncommon phenomenon; WTO and trade rules
governing international agricultural trade have failed to yield the
70
benefits promised to farmers and consumers worldwide.
The WTO's Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) was ostensibly
designed to make agricultural trade more market oriented through
policies that: (1) increased market access by removing various trade
restrictions such as import quotas and tariffs; (2) removed domestic
farm programs that supported safety nets for farmers; and (3)
reduced export subsidies. 7 1 Under the AoA scheme, developing

61.
Id.
Marla Dickerson, Mexico Probes Tortilla Price Hike An Agency Looks Into
62.
Potential Manipulationas Costs Soar More Than 60% in Some Markets, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 12, 2007, at C3.
63.
Bob Tita, Alternative-Fuel Talk Boosts ADM 9%, CRAIN'S CHI. Bus., Mar.
20, 2006.
64.
Tom Philpot, Bad Wrap: How Archer Daniels Midland Cashes in on
Mexico's Tortilla Woes, GRIST, Feb. 22, 2007, http://www.grist.orglcomments/
foodI2007/02/22/tortillas.
65.
Id.
66.
Id.
67.
Roig-Franzia, supra note 58.
68.
Id.
69.
Id.
70.
WALLACH & WOODALL, supranote 45, at 192-200.
71.
Id. at 194-96; see also World Trade Organization [WTO], Agriculture:
Fairer Markets for Farmers, http://www.Wto.Org/English/ThewtoE/WhatisE/Tif_E/
Agrm3_E.Htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2007) [hereinafter WTO Agriculture] (discussing
several details of the AoA).
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countries were promised that their agricultural exports would
increase, which would improve their agricultural sector and reduce
poverty.72 They were also promised that decreased subsidies in
developed countries would decrease agribusiness' grip on world
commodity markets. 73 As in Mexico, however, developing countries
faced increased imports, many of which were below farmers' costs of
production, and these imports have threatened farmers' livelihoods.
The AoA rules allowed developed countries to export low-priced
agricultural goods into many developing countries' markets,
74
collapsing their agricultural prices and bankrupting their farmers.
Only developed countries and a tiny handful of developing countries
have had the administrative or legal resources to enact WTO-allowed
safeguard mechanisms to protect their agriculture producers against
75
import surges.
Further, in terms of exports, a number of policies inhibited
developing countries from benefiting from further development or
increased exports, and the people in those countries that did benefit
were the elite. 76 For example, the WTO permitted "tariff escalation"
to continue. This is a policy where developed countries institute
higher import tariff rates on manufactured or processed agricultural
goods compared to raw-commodity inputs.7 7 This policy has made it
more difficult for developing countries to establish an agricultural
processing sector. 78 Such a sector could strengthen those nations'
economies by generating higher levels of employment and wages than
79
the exportation of raw materials for processed goods.
Additionally, WTO rules directed developing countries to
dismantle domestic farm programs in exchange for access to foreign
markets, much as Mexico eliminated its CONASUPO farm-payment
programs and privatized communal ejido lands.80 Other reforms
encouraged transnational agribusinesses to invest in food retail,
services, and processing.8 1 This has led to a rapid consolidation and
increase in the scale of packing, processing, and exporting firms and

72.
WALLACH & WOODALL, supra note 45, at 193.
73.
Id.
74.
Id. at 196.
75.
Carin Smaller & Anne-Laure Constantin, Institute for Agriculture and
Trade Policy, Moving Forward in 2007: How to Let Go of the Past and Embrace the
Present, Jan. 11, 2007, http://www.tradeobservatory.org/genevaupdate.cfm?messagelD
=121338.
76.
WALLACH & WOODALL, supra note 45, at 198.
77.
Id.
78.
Id.
79.
Id.
80.
See de Ita, supra note 22, at 4 ("On November 7, 1991, as part of a program
for the neoliberal modernization of the countryside, the Mexican government reformed
the agrarian law with the purpose of allowing and even promoting the privatization of
ejidal land, previously inalienable.").
81.
Id.
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growers in some commodity sectors, as well as a substantial exclusion
82
of small farmers and firms.
A United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization study of 14
developing countries found that trade liberalization in the agriculture
sector has led, variously, to little change in developing countries'
exports. 83 It has, however, led to an increase in their food imports,
including those- vital for the countries' food supply, and has also led to
a decline in local production of products facing competition from
cheaper imports.8 4 Finally, it has led to the consolidation of farms
85
and has marginalized small farmers and displaced farm labor.
A 2006 long-term study of 15 developing countries detailed a
number of other negative consequences from agricultural trade
liberalization. 86 Farmers have been vulnerable to agricultural-input
price hikes when government subsidies and credit programs have
been cut. 87 Further, developing states' economies have become
dependent on a few export commodities that could be hit by adverse
weather or collapsing global prices, as happened to coffee in the past
decade. 88 Also, increased commodity imports have not necessarily
translated into higher nutrient availability.8 9 In the end, the study
found that while the undernourished proportion of the population fell
in all but four of the studied countries from 1990 to 2001, the number
of undernourished people actually increased in half the countries. 90
Further, a number of the countries experienced a growing inequality
in poverty rates between rural and urban areas and between poorer
farmers and those wealthy enough access export markets. 91
Countries also saw increased poverty rates for minorities, indigenous
92
populations, and female-headed households.
C. Agriculture and Food Insecurity in Developing Countries under the
Doha Round
The outcome of the current round of agricultural trade
negotiations is unlikely to reduce the number of people in poverty.

82.
FAO Conceptualizingthe Linkages, supra note 14, at 128-29.
83.
Id. at 144.
84.
Martin Khor, Implications of Some WTO Rules on the Realisation of the
MDGs 17 (TWN Trade & Dev. Series, Working Paper No. 26, 2005), available at
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/t&d/tnd26.pdf.
85.
Id.
86.
FAO, Trade Reforms and Food Security: Country Case Studies and
Synthesis (2006) (preparedby Harmon Thomas), availableat ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/
009/a058le/a0581e00.pdf.
87.
Id.
88.
Id.
89.
Id.
90.
Id.
91.
Id.
92.
Id.
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The AoA included a commitment for countries to continue making
changes to trade policies through new negotiations, which were
launched in the 2001 Doha Round WTO talks. 93 Trade ministers
dubbed the Doha Round a "development round"94 in an effort to
secure support of skeptical developing countries. 9 5 The negotiations
have dragged on for six years and have yet to produce an agricultural
agreement because developing countries are reluctant to increase
access to their agricultural markets in the face of surging, low-priced
96
commodities from industrial farms in developed countries.
A 2006 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace report
modeled plausible outcomes of Doha and found that developed
countries will likely receive all the agricultural gains and developing
countries' agricultural sectors will be made worse off. 97 Developing
countries fare poorly under further agricultural trade liberalization
because they cannot afford farm programs as generous as those in
developed countries.9" Further, developing countries have smaller
farms and farms with less access to export facilities. 9 9 Thus,
removing existing trade barriers erodes these countries' current share
of global exports.10 0
The Carnegie paper found that the poorest countries lose under
any likely Doha scenario. 01'
Although potential growth in
manufacturing exports in countries such as China could offset
agricultural losses, countries such as Bangladesh and many in SubSaharan Africa would experience losses in both their agricultural and
manufacturing sectors.
In these countries, more people live in
extreme, one-dollar-per-day poverty-almost as many live in twodollar-per-day poverty-than in China. 0 2
Even "special and
differential treatment" provisions, intended to protect developing
countries' agricultural sectors, would have little effect in actually
03
doing so.'
Thus, agricultural trade liberalization is not necessarily the
solution for reducing world hunger, and it can have seriously negative

93.
WTO Agriculture, supra note 71.
94.
Smaller & Constantin, supra note 75.
95.
Id.
96.
Id.
97.
The report also finds that all the plausible scenarios for negotiations only
produce global gains of less than 0.2% of the global gross domestic product. Even full
trade liberalization (no trade barriers) is only estimated to produce a global gain of
about 0.5%. SANDRA POLASKI, WINNERS AND LOSERS: IMPACT OF THE DOHA ROUND ON

DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
23
(Carnegie
Endowment
http://carnegieendowment.org/filesfWinners.Losers.final2.pdf.
98.

Id. at 24.

99.
100.
101.

Id. at 30-31.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 69-70.

102.

Id. at 56.

103.

Id. at 25.

2006),

available

at
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In fact, the very theory upon which agricultural trade
effects.
liberalization is based, the deeply held theory of comparative
advantage, is flawed when it comes to agriculture. Under this theory,
countries benefit most by producing goods in which they have the
10 4
They should trade
least disadvantage compared to other countries.
10 5
The theory holds, for example, that because of
for other products.
their respective climates, many developing countries should be made
better off by growing exportable crops such as coffee, cocoa, tea,
rubber, cotton, or sugar, instead of food crops. Money made from
exporting these goods should be used to purchase imported food from
countries that can produce it more easily, either because of capital or
climate. This assumes, however, that as agricultural prices fluctuate,
10 6
In
resources can be easily reallocated to produce different crops.
reality, costs and barriers prevent farmers from easily switching
crops in developing countries.1 0 7 Further, hunger is the real social
consequence when prices drop and people can no longer afford to
purchase or grow food. These transition costs and consequences are
likely to be relatively greater in developing countries because they
have less diversified economies and fewer alternative sources of
10 8
employment than developed countries.

Jos6 Maria Caballero, Maria Grazia Quieti, & Materne Maetz,
104.
International Trade: Some Basic Theories and Concepts, in MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS ON AGRICULTURE: A RESOURCE MANUAL-INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL
ToPIcs § 2.1.1 (FAO 2000).
105.
Id.
Id.
106.
107.
Id.
POLASKI, supra note 97. Further, the theory of comparative advantage
108.
assumes that markets are perfectly competitive and that capital does not flow across
national boundaries. Both of these assumptions are called into question in the existing
world agricultural market. Caballero, Quieti, & Maetz, supra note 104, § 2.1.1. Trade
distortions in the international agricultural market include inelasticities of supply and
demand. Further, the market is dominated by a handful of large multinational
corporations, which have created a market that is oligopolistic-that is, it has only a
few suppliers-while their retail sectors are oligopsonistic with only a few buyers. For
example, Cargill and ADM together control two thirds of the international market for
cereals. Large companies use their market power to depress the prices at which
farmers sell their commodities, while avoiding passing savings onto consumers. Such
companies also pressure WTO and individual governments to accept rules such as
tariff escalation and remove other national and international measures that help to
Jacques Berthelot, Food Soveignty [sic],
protect domestic commodity prices.
Agricultural Prices, and World Markets 3-6, Nov. 2006, http://www.roppa.info/IMG/pdf/
J. Berthelot-Foodsovereignty-agricultural-prices-and worldmarketsROPPANovember_06.pdf.
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THE OPPORTUNITIES AND LIMITS OF THE RIGHT TO FOOD AS
EMBODIED IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

In light of the inevitable transitional costs and market
distortions in international agricultural trade that can harm the poor,
and in lieu of workable market-based safety nets, it is worth
exploring whether and how human rights law can safeguard people's
right to food and help the world meet its World Food Summit goals.
Over the last 60 years, the international human right to food has
been substantially refined as a concept, to the point where it could
serve as a tool for redressing economic harms forced by trade
liberalization. 10 9
The implementation of this area of law at the
national, regional, and international levels has been slow, however.1 1 0
Further, no tribunal at
any level has applied
the treaty
extraterritorially. 1 1 1
These limits mean that the right to food is
unlikely to serve as a useful tool to provide redress to those facing
food insecurity due to multilateral trade agreements arising out of

the Doha Round.
A. The InternationalHuman Right to Adequate Food
The right to food was first recognized in Article 25 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was adopted by the
UN General Assembly in 1948.112 The right was codified in 1966 in
Article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and

109.
Some observers have remarked that there is no formal link between
international human rights law, such as the right to adequate food, and WTO
negotiations. See, e.g., Kevin R. Gray, Right to Food Principles Vis A Vis Rules
Governing International Trade 3, 7, Dec. 2003, http://www.cid.harvard.edu
cidtrade[Papers/gray.pdf. But states that have ratified human rights laws cannot
completely abandon their obligations within an international trade framework because
of the principle of pacta sunt servanda, as codified in the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, Article 26, which has been ratified by 105 countries and which entered
into force on January 27, 1980. Many other countries that have not ratified the treaty,
such as the United States, recognize that this principle is binding as customary
international law.
Under this principle, later WTO treaties and the national
implementing policies must operate in a manner that is compatible with a nation's
prior human rights obligations, including the right to adequate food.
110.
See discussion infra Part I.B.
111.
See discussion infra Part I.C.
112.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 25, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) available at
http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html ("Everyone has the right to a standard of
living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family, including
food....").
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Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which went into effect in 1976.113 It has
been accepted by 153 countries, and has been signed by five
additional countries. 114 It has two basic provisions. The first has
been described as a relative right to adequate food:
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of
everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family,
including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous
improvement of living conditions. The States Parties will take
appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to
this effect the essential importance of international co-operation based
115
on free consent.

The second is a right to be free from hunger. 116 This paper primarily
addresses the right to adequate food.
1.

General Comment 12 and the Maastrict Guidelines

The UN body charged with monitoring this covenant, the
Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, was established
in 1985.117 The committee has attempted to add detail to the
ICESCR obligations through a series of General Comments. 118 While
the General Comments are nonbinding, the interpretation of the
covenant's rights and obligations represent a substantial step
towards the realization of ICESCR rights.
General Comment 12, issued in 1999, contains the committee's
interpretation of the right to adequate food. 119 It provides that the
right to adequate food is to be construed broadly to ensure that ".
every man, woman and child, alone or in community with others, has
physical and economic access at all times to adequate food or means
for its procurement.' 120 The right entails "[the availability of food in
a quantity and quality sufficient to satisfy the dietary needs of

113.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [ICESCR],
G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 11 (Dec. 16, 1976), availableat http://www.unhchr.ch/html/
menu3fb/a cescr.htm.
114.
Office of the United Nations High Comm'r for Human Rights, Status of
Ratifications of the PrincipalInternationalHuman Rights Treaties, 12 (July 14, 2006),
available at http://www.ohchr.org/englishlbodies/docs/status.pdf.
115.
ICESCR, supra note 113, art. 11(1).
116.
Id. art. 11(2).
117.
Office of the United Nations High Comm'r for Human Rights, The
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Fact Sheet No.16 (Rev.1), § 6,
http:/www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fsl6.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2007).
118.
Id.
119.
U.N. Comm on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights [CESCR], Substantive Issues
Arising In The Implementation Of The International Covenant On Economic, Social
And CulturalRights: General Comment 12 The Right To Adequate Food (Art. 11), U.N.
Doc E/C.12/1999/5 (May 12, 1999) [hereinafter Right to Adequate Food], available at
http://www.unhchr.chltbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/3dO2758c707031d58025677fOO3b73b9?Open
document.
120.
Id.
6.
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individuals, free from adverse substances, and acceptable within a
given culture[.]' 12 1 It is not measured by a minimum set of calories
or nutrients and ensures access and availability for future
generations. 122 Access to adequate food means that food must be both
economically and physically accessible. 12 3 Availability refers to
people's ability to feed themselves directly from productive land or
other natural resources or by way of well-functioning distribution,
processing, and market systems. 124 Any person or group denied the
right to adequate food is entitled to both adequate reparation, in the
form of restitution, compensation, or a guarantee of non-repetition,
and access to effective judicial or other appropriate remedies at
125
national and international levels.
Thus defined, the right to adequate food can be seen as a
safeguard against food insecurity in a world of free trade. States
must afford all people physical and economic access to and the
availability of food at all times, notwithstanding transitional costs or
market failures. When they do not, they must provide compensation
126
to people who are deprived.
General Comment 12 sets out a three-part typology detailing
how states can meet their obligations: states have a duty to respect,
protect, and fulfill. 1 27 The obligation to respect requires that states
avoid taking actions that deny or make it difficult to gain access and
availability to adequate food.' 28 The obligation to protect requires
that states act to ensure that other enterprises or individuals do not
deprive individuals of their access to and the availability of adequate
food. 1 29
Finally, the obligation to fulfill incorporates both an
obligation to facilitate and an obligation to provide.' 3 0 The obligation
to facilitate means the state must proactively engage in activities to
strengthen people's access to, and utilization of, resources and means
to ensure their livelihood. 131 The duty to provide requires that states
fulfill the right to adequate food when people cannot do so themselves

121.
Id. 8.
122.
Id.
6-7.
123.
Id.
13.
124.
Id.
12.
125.
Id. T 32.
126.
Further, like the concept of food sovereignty, discussed below, the
committee's concept of availability recognizes that the right to food is more than simply
ensuring that people have enough food, a concept that falls more in line with how the
committee describes the right to be free from hunger. The committee's concept of the
right to adequate food measures the quantity and quality of food against cultural
norms and that access to food should be sustainable. Id.
8.
127.
Id.
15.
128.

Id.

129.
130.

Id.
Id.

131.

Id.
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for reasons beyond their control. 132 States can violate the right to
adequate food through either actions or omissions.13 3 States do have
a defense: a state does not violate the right to food if it is simply
unable to comply, but only when it is unwilling to do so, or when it
134
discriminates and denies the right to some people.
The right to adequate food, like the rest of the ICESCR, is
1 35
intended to only be achievable through "progressive realization."
This does not mean, however, that the right is somehow aspirational
or otherwise devoid of concrete or enforceable obligations. Comment
12 incorporates by reference General Comment 3,136 which states
that the concept of progressive realization
constitutes a recognition of the fact that full realization of all economic,
social[,] and cultural rights will generally not be able to be achieved in
a short period of time ....

be misinterpreted
content.

137

Nevertheless, . . . the Covenant should not

as depriving the obligation of all meaningful

Thus, states' obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill the right
to adequate food are only met when they take steps forward. States
may not take steps backward unless their maximum available
resources require them to, or unless other rights would be
jeopardized. 138 At the very least, states must ensure the minimum
essential level of resources required so that people are free from
hunger.' 3 9 In implementing the right to adequate food, states are
given some discretion in determining their approaches, but arguably
it is not enough for a state simply to adhere to the doctrine of trade
liberalization and to shrug its proverbial shoulders when the real
world does not match the projections of its models. States must adopt
"a national strategy to ensure food and nutrition security for all,
based on human rights principles that define the objectives . . . and
1 40
the formulation of policies and corresponding benchmarks.'
In 1997, a group of experts issued the Maastricht Guidelines, a
document intended to reflect the current state of international law as
it related to the ICESCR. 141 For the most part, these mirror the
General Comments. The Maastricht Guidelines also provide two

132.
133.

Id.

134.

Id.

Id. T 17.
17-18.

135.
Id.
14.
136.
Id.
137.
CESR, General Comment 3: The Nature of States Parties Obligations (art.2,
para. 1 of the Covenant), T 9 (1990), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/
(Symbol)/94bdbaf59b43a424c12563ed0052b664?Opendocument.
138.
Right to Adequate Food, supra note 119, 17.
139.
Id.
140.
Id. 21.
141.
These updated the 1986 Limburg Principles. Maastricht, Guidelines on
Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 691, 691 (1998).
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standards of care under which states are obliged to operate: "The
obligation of conduct requires action reasonably calculated to realize
the enjoyment of a particular right . . . The obligation of result
requires States to achieve specific targets to satisfy a detailed
142
substantive standard."'
2.

Possible Claims for Violating the Right to Adequate Food

Thus, under the Comment 12 and Maastricht guidelines, one can
see at least an outline of a case by consumers and farmers for
compensation against the Mexican government (which acceded to the
ICESCR in 1981) 14 3 for some of its most egregious trade-liberalization
policies prior to and under NAFTA. For example, it might be argued
that the Mexican government's failure to collect tariff duties for
imports above its quotas unreasonably estimated, or even willfully
144
neglected, the effects on Mexican farmers' right to adequate food.
Insofar as the Mexican government's disregard of the NAFTA tariff
quota structure caused corn prices to fall below farmers' production
costs, the Mexican government violated their obligations to respect
and protect farmers by denying them the ability to supply food for
themselves and their families through well-functioning markets.
It could also be argued that the "agrarian reforms" adopted by
Mexico in the early 1990s were a violation of the duty to respect and
protect because local and regional officials willfully manipulated
ejidos in order to force them to certify their lands, thus depriving poor
farmers of the ability to feed themselves directly from productive land
after they were exposed to market forces.
Likewise, it could be argued that Mexico violated its obligation to
protect Mexican consumers when it removed the price caps for corn
products, such as tortillas, because it unreasonably failed to protect
consumers from the inflated prices that likely would result from
market concentration within the corn-commodity chain. This denied
consumers the ability to feed themselves through well-functioning
distribution, processing, and market systems. By the same standard,
the Mexican government is currently violating its duty to protect
consumers by failing to reinstitute workable price caps.
Under ICESCR, then, the Mexican government would be
required, among other remedies, to enjoin all policies that deprive

142.
Id.
7. The Guidelines also put out 17 examples of acts of omission and
commission that would constitute violations. Id.
14-15.
143.
Office of the United Nations High Comm'r for Human Rights, supra note
114, at 7.
144.
This might not be that difficult to prove, given the Mexican Undersecretary
of Agriculture Luis Tellez predicted that NAFTA, as written, would push an annual
average of one million farmers off their farms each year for ten years. WALLACH &
WOODALL, supra note 45, 350 n.80.

1088

VANDERBIL TIOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 40.1071

people of their rights or pay reparations to Mexican farmers and
consumers.
As a result of the Doha Round negotiations, other states could
similarly be held accountable for any further agricultural trade
liberalization policies they implement that deny people's right to
adequate food. Such policies might include those that increase
developed countries' dumping of agricultural products into developing
countries' markets, "agrarian reform" policies that force poor farmers
from their land, or policies that enhance the abilities of corporations
with substantial market share to raise consumer food prices.
This is not to say that any of the claims outlined here would
succeed. They would have to be decided based on evolving precedent
by courts or tribunals vested with the power to hear claims and
defenses and weigh competing evidence. Further, as the Maastricht
guidelines recommend, legislatures or administrative bodies should
enact standards to further flesh out state obligations. 145 The claims
outlined here simply demonstrate that the committee's work on
General Comment 12 and the Maastricht guidelines are a substantial
development towards more fully defining the right to adequate
food, 146 and that this right could theoretically redress the economic
harms forced by trade liberalization under multilateral trade
agreements such as the Doha Round.
B. The Developmental Limits of the InternationalRight to Food: A
Lack of Implementation
To have any legitimacy, the right to adequate food must be
recognized by national, regional, and international institutions that
have been bestowed legitimate authority to decide when nations'
policies unreasonably deny people their rights.
Unfortunately,
despite the progress that the General Comments and Maastricht
Guidelines have made in defining the international right to adequate
food, the implementation of this area of law at the national, regional,
and international levels is in its infancy.

145.
Maastricht, supra note 141,
30. In fact, in 2004, the FAO adopted
voluntary guidelines. See FAO, Voluntary Guidelines to Support the Progressive
Realization of the Right to Adequate Food in the Context of National Food Security
(2004), http:lwww.fao.org/righttofood/vg/vgs-en.htm.
146.
As two opponents to ICESCR's enforceability have pointed out: "Not only
has the Committee defined ICESCR rights very broadly, but the substance of its
commentaries makes its pro-adjudication stance abundantly clear. In its view, the
ICESCR unquestionably imposes binding and enforceable obligations on states
parties." Michael J. Dennis & David P. Stewart, Justiciabilityof Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights: Should There be an International Complaints Mechanism to
Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water, Housing, and Health?, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 462, 491
(2004).
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National Development

Under ICESCR, the primary responsibility for ensuring the full
enjoyment of the right to adequate food lies with the national
authorities of each country. 147 Only a few countries have adopted
national legislation to ensure the right to adequate food's
enjoyment. 148 Approximately 77 signatory states have legal systems
that directly recognize ICESCR rights as part of the domestic legal
order, 149 but only a few countries' tribunals are like Argentina's and
recognize the right of individuals to raise ICESCR claims simply due
to the countries' ratification of the covenant. 150
Further, while more than 20 countries have enshrined the right
to adequate food in their national constitutions, 15 1 South Africa,
India, and Switzerland are the only countries that have made the
constitutional right to food enforceable through courts. 152 India's
Supreme Court and Switzerland's Federal Tribunal are the only
national courts to have decided the substantive merits of cases
cases
directly involving the right to adequate food. 15 3 None of these 154
directly involve deprivations due to trade-liberalization policies.
Thus, while progress has been a made at the national level
towards implementing the right to adequate food, such progress has
been limited to a handful of cases with precedential value. For
example, in South Africa, the state's denial of the right to adequate
The litigation
food has only been challenged once, in 2005.155
stemmed from the government's effective denial of fishing rights for
artisanal fishermen, who have historically lived in shoreside
communities, used low-technology fishing gear, and harvested a

147.
Right to Adequate Food, supra note 119, 20.
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, The Right to Food:
148.
Achievements and Challenges, 28, delivered to the World Food Summit: Five Years
Later (June 2002), available at http://www.fao.org/Legal/rtf/wfs.htm.
149.
Margret Vidar, State Recognition of the Right to Food at the NationalLevel,
§ 2.4 (U.N. Univ. World Inst. for Dev. Econ. Research, Research Paper No. 2006/61,
2006), available at http://www.rlc.fao.org/iniciativa/pdf/DAmundo.pdf.
Europe-Third World Centre [CETIM], The Right to Food, A Fundamental
150.
Human Right Affirmed by the United Nations and Recognized in Regional Treaties and
Numerous National Constitutions 21, available at http://www.cetim.ch/enfbrol-aliman.pdf.pdf [hereinafter CETIM] (preparedby Christophe Golay & Melik Ozden).
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, supra note 148,
151.
20.
CETIM, supra note 150, at 23.
152.
153.
Id. at 24, 26. The India Supreme Court recognized the right to food in 2003
in People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India & Others, Interim Order, Writ
Petition (Civil) No.196 of 2001 (May 2, 2003), available at http://www.escrnet.org/usr.doc/InterimOrder-of-May-2.doc.
154.
See CETIM, supra note 150, at 24, 26.
See Minister of Envtl. Affairs & Tourism v. George & Others 2007 (3) SA 62
155.
(SCA) (S. Afr.).
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specific variety of marine species. 156 After active lobbying by largescale commercial fishing companies, the South African authorities
implemented a long-term fishing rights policy that forced artisanal
fishermen to either form companies and compete with the larger
commercial sector for high-value species or apply as individuals for a
limited catch of a few nearshore species. 15 7 The artisanal fishermen
sued claiming among other things that the legislative framework
158
The case is pending.' 5 9
denied their right to adequate food.
2.

Regional Development

Three regional human rights systems recognize the right to
adequate food: the African, European, and Inter-American
In the Inter-American system, the Protocol of San
systems. 160
Salvador's addition to the 1969 American Convention on Human
Rights is the only regional text that explicitly recognizes the right to
adequate food. 16 1 Article 12 states that "[e]veryone has the right to
adequate nutrition[,] which guarantees the possibility of enjoying the
highest
level
of
physical,
emotional[,J
and
intellectual
development."' 16 2 In Africa, the right to adequate food is protected by
the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (the
ACHPR), which is binding on 53 states. 16 3 The African Commission
on Human and Peoples' Rights has recognized that a country that has
ratified the ACRHPR and the ICESCR has the obligation to take

156.
Id. at 66.
157.
Naseegh Jaffer & Jackie Sunde, Fishing Rights vs Human Rights? An
Ongoing Class Action Litigation in South Africa Brings to Focus the Challenge to the
Rights-Based Management System in the Country'sFisheries, 44 SAMUDRA REP. 20, 20,
22 (2006), available at http://www.icsf.net/icsf2006/uploads/publications/samudrapdf/
englishlissue_441art04.pdf.
158.
Id. at 24.
159.
Id. at 22.
160.
On the other hand, no regional text for the protection of human rights
exists in Asia. CETIM, supra note 150, at 12.
161.
Id.
162.
Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the
Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 12, Nov. 14, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 156.
163.
Org. of Afr. Unity [OAU], List of Countries that Have Signed,
Ratified/Acceded to the African Union Convention on African Charteron Human and
People's Rights (May 26, 2007), http://www.africa-union.org/rootlauDocuments/
Treaties/List/African%20Charter%20on%20Human%20and%20Peoples%2ORights.pdf
(last visited Sept. 22, 2007). It is also protected by the 1990 African Charter on the
Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC). ACRWC signatories have effectively
committed themselves "to ensure the provision of adequate nutrition and safe drinking
water." OAU, African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child art. 14, O.A.U.
Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49, available at http://www.africa-union.org/rootlauDocuments/
Treaties/TextA.%20C.%200N%20THE%20RIGHT%20AND%20WELF%200F%20CHI
LD.pdf.
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measures to fulfill the right to adequate food. 1 64 The European Social
Charter does not specifically recognize the right to food because the
rights to
drafters contemplated no need to protect it as long as 16the
5
guaranteed.
are
welfare
social
and
security,
social
work,
Notwithstanding that all but the European system have
commissions empowered to decide individual complaints for
violations of the right to adequate food, 16 6 those deprived of their
right have only been able to obtain redress for violations in a few
instances using the regional systems. This is perhaps due to the lack
of power that regional commissions have to enjoin or demand
reparations from non-complying states, or the burdensome
procedures that injured parties must follow to have their complaints
heard before regional courts.
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, for example,
16 7
does not have the power to demand injunctions or reparations.
The Commission has only decided one case involving the Protocol's
right to food.' 68 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, on the
other hand, can demand reparations from violating states under the
Protocol of San Salvador, but can only hear individual complaints
referred by the Commission. 169 The Inter-American Court has only
decided one case on the right to adequate food. In the 2005 case of
Comunidad Indigena Yakye Axa v. Paraguay, a Paraguayan
indigenous community alleged that Paraguay had failed to
acknowledge its right to property over ancestral land. 1 70 Among
other findings, the court concluded that, in denying the community
access to its traditional means of livelihood, Paraguay had denied the
of
indigenous people the right to life, which included standards 171
health, education, and food set forth in the San Salvador Protocol.
In its decision, the court found the General Comments by the
Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights to be
influential. 172 The court stated that it would supervise enforcement

164.
See Soc. & Econ. Rights Action Ctr. for Econ. & Soc. Rights v. Nigeria,
Comm. No. 155/96, arts. 64-65 (Afr. Comm'n on Human & People's Rights, Oct. 2001),
available at http://www.escr-net.org/caselaw/caselawshow.htm?docid=404115.
CETIM, supra note 150, at 14.
165.
Id.
166.
Org. of American States [OAS], American Convention on Human Rights
167.
arts. 34-51, 9 I.L.M. 643 (Nov. 1969).
(Riachito) Indigenous
& Kayleyphapopyet
See Enxet-Lamenxay
168.
Communities v. Paraguay, Case No. 11.713, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 90/99,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, doe. 6 rev. (1999).
OAS, supra note 167, arts. 61, 63.
169.
Yakye Axa Indigenous Community of the Enxet-Lengua People v.
170,
Paraguay, Case No. 12.313, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 2/02, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117,
doe. 1 rev. 1 2 (2003).
Id. I 161-68.
171.
Id.
166-67.
172.

1092

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LA W

[VOL. 40.1071

of measures Paraguay was required to adopt to address the
violation.173
Perhaps the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights has
the most potential among the regional courts to serve as a forum to
redress violations of the right to adequate food. Created in 1998,
when African countries adopted the Protocol to the ACHPR, it became
effective in 2004, and judges were first inaugurated in 2006.174 Those
deprived of the right to food will be able to file complaints against all
parties to the African Protocol and request reparations and
compensation. 7 5 Bureaucratic hurdles exist, however. In order to
file a complaint, the parties must have exhausted all recourses
available at the national level. 176
Further, no standing is given to
177
non-governmental organizations on behalf of individuals.
3.

International Development

Internationally, the sole implementing body for the right to
adequate food is the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, which is not a treaty body and whose recommendations are
not binding on the state parties to the ICESCR. 178 In 1990, the
committee initiated discussions on the adoption of an Optional
Protocol that would enable individuals and groups to bring
complaints for violations of the ICESCR. 179 The committee finally
issued its first mandate to a working group to draft such a protocol in
2006.180
C. The Developmental Limits of the InternationalRight to Food:
Limits on Extraterritoriality
Perhaps the biggest pragmatic limitation in using the right to
adequate food to remedy violations from trade rules resulting from
the Doha Round negotiations or other multilateral trade agreements
is the extent to which the right applies extraterritorially. This paper
has thus far focused on a state's violation of its own peoples' right to

173.
Id. 241.
174.
Scott Lyons, The African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, 10 ASIL
INSIGHTS 24 (2006), availableat http://www.asil.org/insights/2006/09/insightsO60919.html.
175.
CETIM, supra note 150, at 29.
176.
Id.
177.
Id.
178.
Id. at 32-33.
179.
The International Network for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ESCR-Net), Resource Page on the Optional Protocol to the InternationalCovenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Section 1: History of the OP-ICESCR Process,
http://www.escr-net.org/resources-more/resources-more-show.htm?doc-id=421703 (last
visited Sept. 22, 2007).
180.
Id.
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adequate food, particularly Mexico's possible violations from tradeliberalization policies and NAFTA. But the United States, arguably,
also should be held accountable for its policies that encouraged
Mexico to import U.S. corn at levels that harmed Mexican farmers
and consumers. And therefore-setting aside the fact that the United
States has signed but not ratified the ICESCR, which substantially
complicates the matter' 8 1-the United States also should be held
responsible for denying Mexicans their right to adequate food.
With trade liberalization, a substantial number of actions that
violate the right to adequate food are likely to harm-if not be
182
directed at-people living beyond violating states' borders.
Therefore, in order to serve as a truly useful tool, state obligations to
respect, protect, and fulfill the right to adequate food must apply
irrespective of state boundaries.' 8 3 Unfortunately, there has been
little clarity about the extraterritorial reach of the right to adequate
food. Under Article 29 of the Vienna Law of Treaties, a treaty is
binding only upon each party with respect to its own territory,
"[u]nless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise
established . . ." And while the ICESCR does not contain a provision
specifying its jurisdictional scope, it also, unlike other human rights
treaties, 8 4 does not specifically state that it has extraterritorial
application either.' 8 5 Rather, the ICESCR indicates that states only
have obligations to those outside their borders under an "obligation of
international cooperation." Article 11(1) provides that states "will
take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right,
recognizing to this effect the essential importance of international co1 86
operation based on free consent."'

181.
Arguably, the United States must still refrain from taking action that
would go against the object and purpose of the treaty. But this obligation only applies
until the state has made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty. See
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 332.
182.
As the U.N. Special Rapporteur for the Right to Food states:
• . . [I]n an age of globalization and increasing interconnectedness, when the
actions and policies of every country can have far-reaching effects on people
living in other countries, there is a need to extend a State's obligations under
human rights to include extra-territorial obligations towards the right to food
of people living in other countries.
ECOSOC, supra note 7, at Summary.
In addition, small underdeveloped nations may be unable to cope with the
183.
power of large companies. In many instances, developing countries' governments and
their ruling elites actually benefit from corporations' unregulated behavior to the
detriment of poorer populations. Smita Narula, The Right to Food: Holding Global
Actors Accountable Under International Law, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 691, 757

(2006).
184.
185.
individuals
186.

Id. at 728.
See id. at 694 (explaining that States Parties' obligations are limited to
in their territory or under their jurisdiction).
ICESCR, supra note 113, 11.
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It is unclear what the "obligation of international cooperation"
requires. The Maastricht Guidelines have a limited view on states'
extraterritorial duties under IESCR. They provide that states have
obligations outside their territory when "exercising effective control"
over a territory, such as "under conditions of colonialism, other forms
of alien domination[,] and military occupation." 187 The guidelines do
state, however, that states must ". . . take into account its
international legal obligations in the field of economic, social[,] and
cultural rights when entering into bilateral or multilateral
agreements with other States, international organizations[,] or
'88
multinational corporations.'
In General Comment 12, the Committee on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights indicates that states have both individual and
joint obligations under the right to adequate food, and that these
commitments extend outside of states' territorial borders. Certain
actions,
such as food embargoes, are
strictly forbidden,
notwithstanding that the effects might be felt solely within other
countries.' 8 9 The committee also states:
In implementing this commitment, States parties should take steps to
respect the enjoyment of the right to food in other countries, to protect
that right, to facilitate access to food[,] and to provide the necessary aid
when required. 19 0

The UN's Special Rapporteur has seized on this language to offer
the most developed and progressive conception of the extraterritorial
reach of the right to adequate food. 19 1 The extraterritorial obligation
to respect requires that states refrain at all times from implementing
policies with foreseeable negative effects on people's right to adequate
food in other countries:
Policies such as export subsidies for agriculture may also have negative
effects when production is exported to agrarian-based developing
countries. It is clear that such policies will have a negative impact on
the right to food of people living in those countries since their

187.
Maastricht, supra note 141, 17. This aligns with traditional international
jurisprudence, under which a nation's obligations have only been found to apply
outside its territory in situations where the state exercises jurisdiction through
"effective control," involving situations of occupation or armed conflict. For the
effective control doctrine to be useful within the context of international trade, it would
have to apply when states exercise effective economic control over countries outside
their territories. This would be a radical departure from the doctrine as it currently
stands. And while such arguments might be worth pursuing, they are completely
untested. Narula, supra note 183, at 734-35.
188.
Maastricht, supra note 141,
156). States must also "use their influence"
to ensure that violations of ICESCR do not result from policies they adopt within
international organizations. Id.
19.
189.
Right to Adequate Food, supra note 119, 37.
190.
Id. 36.
191.
See ECOSOC, supra note 7.
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livelihoods will be destroyed and they will not be able to purchase food,
19 2
even if the food is cheaper.

Further, the extraterritorial obligation to protect requires states
to engage in adequate regulation to ensure that the policies and
activities of transnational corporations respect the right to food of all
people in the countries where they are working, especially "[w]ith the
increasing monopoly control by transnational corporations over all
components of the food distribution chain. 193 Finally, governments
have an extraterritorial duty to protect the right to adequate food by
cooperating to provide an enabling environment for the realization of
the right in all countries. 194 For example, states must implement
equitable trade rules. 195 Governments must also provide assistance,
to the extent that their resources permit, when individuals are
suffering in another country, such as in a situation of widespread
196
famine.
Under this construction, it might be argued that the United
States violated Mexican farmers' right to adequate food by adopting
policies that abandoned price floors and food-security reserves,
thereby encouraging oversupply and causing corn prices to plummet.
The U.S. failure to adopt policies to prevent the export of corn at
prices and levels that would inevitably displace farmers was also
likely a violation. 197 Further, the U.S. might be liable to consumers
for its failures to enforce antitrust laws that have led to a
concentration in agribusiness and resulted in the price gouging of
corn products.
Similar arguments might also apply within the context of any
further trade-liberalization policies that result from the Doha Round.
Unfortunately, the argument advanced by the Special Rapporteur has
not been recognized thus far by any national, regional, or
international body.

IV. AN ALTERNATIVE

STRATEGY: THE FOOD SOVEREIGNTY MOVEMENT

While its slow development is not a fundamental flaw, if the
ICESCR is the only tool to protect people's right to adequate food in a
world of increased trade liberalization, it is, pragmatically speaking,
woefully inadequate; trade liberalization is occurring at the speed of

192.
Id. 35.
193.
Id. 36.
194.
Id. 37.
195.
Id.
196.
Id. 38.
197.
After all, when NAFTA was being negotiated, U.S. corn cost $110 per ton,
compared to Mexico's floor price of $240 per ton, after all. WALLACH & WOODALL,
supra note 45, at 199.
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light, while the implementation of the right to adequate food is
moving at a slow crawl. The limitations in the law's development
suggest a need for an alternative strategy.
The concept of food sovereignty, first launched in 1996 at the
World Food Summit, provides such a strategy. Food sovereignty is
the right of peoples to define their own food and agriculture policies,
to protect and regulate domestic agricultural production and trade in
order to achieve sustainable development, and to determine the
extent to which they want to be self-reliant in food production. 198 It
is not against trade, but it is against dumping imports and argues
that production for local and national markets is more important
than production for exports. 19 9 Each country should have the right to
determine the extent to which it wants to be self-reliant in domestic
production for basic food needs. 200 A stable trading system can
contribute to improving overall food availability, but true food
through cheap
security for farmers and consumers cannot be assured
20 1
food imports, such as in the case of corn in Mexico.
Unlike the ICESCR, which might be seen as an overlay to the
separate system of free trade under the WTO, 20 2 one of food
sovereignty's key principles is that the WTO should cease control over
food and agriculture and that individuals and nations should reclaim
sovereignty over food-security policy.20 3 While the implementation of
the ICESCR over time might advance to the point that it could
redress deprivations of the right to adequate food brought on by
agricultural trade liberalization, in essence, food sovereignty states
that, given trade liberalization's harms, the only way to protect
people's right to adequate food is to protect the right before
20 4
liberalizing trade.
On February 23, 2007, more than 500 people from more than 80
countries, including representatives from organizations of peasants
and family farmers, artisanal fisherfolk, indigenous peoples, landless
pastoralists, and forest
migrants,
peoples, rural workers,
communities, as well as representatives from women, youth,
consumer, and environmental and urban movements, gathered
together in the village of Ny6l~ni in Selingue, Mali to deepen their

Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Economic, Social and Cultural
198.
Rights: The Right to Food, 25, delivered to the Commission on Human Rights, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/2004/1O (Feb. 9, 2004), available at http://www.righttofood.org/
ECN4200410.pdf.
Id. 28.
199.
Id.
200.
Id.
201.
See Narula, supra note 183.
202.
203.
Ny6l6ni, Declaration of Ny6l6ni 2-3 (Feb. 27, 2007), http://www.
nyeleni2007.org/IMG/pdf/DeclNyeleni-en.pdf.
See id. at 1-3.
204.
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understanding of food sovereignty. 20 5 A set of joint strategies and an
action agenda were formulated to more fully flesh out the movement's
aims. 20 6 Paraphrasing the items most relevant to this paper, their
strategies include:
" Fighting for alternative policies in developed countries that
include production controls, supply management, and price
supports to prevent dumping and promote family-farm
agriculture over agribusiness;
• Targeting the WTO and regional and bilateral trade
agreements to stop allowing dumping and the inappropriate
use food aid;
" Pressuring
governments
to implement
international
agreements that support food sovereignty and, in the
framework of these agreements, enact legislation that
eliminates policies and practices that undermine it;
" Fighting against the corporate control of the food chain by
demanding that governments enact policies that limit
corporate control and facilitate community control over food
production and distribution; and
" Fighting for a comprehensive, genuine agrarian reform that
ensures priority use of land, water, seeds and livestock breeds
for food production and other local needs, rather than
production for exports, and that upholds the rights of women,
indigenous
peoples,
peasants,
fisherfolk,
workers,
pastoralists, migrants, and future generations.
Through these and other strategies, the movement intends to prevent
20 7
food insecurity by promoting local autonomy in food production.
In January 2007, the United Organizations of the National
Union of Autonomous Regional Campesino Organizations, a nonprofit network of Mexican campesino and indigenous farming
organizations, issued a declaration that highlights how these general
food sovereignty principles might translate into a specific national
policy for corn in Mexico. 208 Among other things, the organization
demanded that the Mexican government: (1) renegotiate the
agriculture chapter of NAFTA; (2) establish a floor price for corn and
other basic food products that compensates for the costs of production
and allows for a comparable standard of living to the producers of
Mexico's trading partners; (3) introduce an antitrust initiative to

205.
Id. at 1.
206.
Ny6l6ni, Synthesis Report (2007), http://www.nyeleni20O7.org/IMG/pdf/
3lMar2007NyeleniSynthesisReport-en.pdf.
207. Id.
208.
Food First, Institute for Food and Development Policy, Chilpancingo
Declaration for Food Sovereignty in Mexico Issued January 26, 2007,
http://www.foodfirst.org/node/1650 (last visited Dec. 4, 2007).
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discourage the monopolistic concentration of the basic crops market;
and (4) guarantee a maximum sale price of tortillas to consumers,
subsidized by the State if necessary. 20 9 These policies would go a long
way towards protecting Mexican farmers and consumers from further
food insecurity created by agricultural trade liberalization.

V. CONCLUSION

The experiences of Mexican consumers and farmers after NAFTA
show that trade-liberalization policies and free trade agreements do
not solve food insecurity. Unfortunately, the international human
right to adequate food is not a well-developed tool for individuals to
redress harms resulting from the Doha Round negotiations.
Promoting food sovereignty is a more viable strategy because one of
its central tenets is that the WTO should cease control over
agriculture and that people should reclaim sovereignty over food
policy. In fact, in his 2004 report, the Right to Food's Special
Rapporteur insinuated that food sovereignty might even be obligatory
Stating that since under the right to
for ICESCR signatories.
adequate food governments are legally bound to
. . . find[] the best way of ensuring food security for all their
people ... [,] it is now time to look at alternative means that could
better ensure the right to food. Food sovereignty offers an alternative
vision that puts food security first and treats trade as a means to an
2 10
end, rather than as an end in itself.

209.
210.

Id.
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, supra note 198,

33.

